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LABOUR STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ALL 
STATES SHOULD HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PUNISH 
MISCONDUCTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 






This article addresses the issues of unethical employment practices and 
lack of fair labor standards in developing countries. The discussion on such 
problems, although ongoing since the 1970s, is still of primary importance 
both within the scholarly community and the wider public. The fact that big, 
multinational enterprises of developed countries still engage in violations of 
workers’ rights is certainly stunning, yet not so surprising given the 
connections between such violations and the current structure of the global 
economy. In the wake of a nearly fifty-years-old process of globalization, 
the worldwide implementation of competition rules in the labor market 
stimulates “race to the bottom” outcomes, with millions of workers in 
developing countries suffering from slavery-like working conditions, wages 
below subsistence level, and inhumane treatments. 
Despite the progress made in the field of labor protection thanks to 
private and governmental initiatives in the last several decades, the current 
legal tools used to avoid massive workers’ rights violations have been 
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proven ineffective. This is due to the apparently unsolvable friction that 
exists between the huge economic power of enterprises and the desperate 
need for economic support of developing countries. 
Given the global nature of these causes, possible solutions may only 
achieve success if they entail a global approach to the problem. Remedies 
should be found in order to create a universal rule for labor protection 
applicable and enforceable in all countries throughout the world. 
The first part of this article explains which are the most widespread 
violations of workers’ rights in relation to the current economic structure of 
the world, and presents the economic dynamics that lie within them. The 
second part provides a short account of past and present initiatives in favor 
of the improvement of labor standards. The third part presents the main 
critical aspects of these initiatives, by focusing on lack of accountability 
mechanisms and their inherent voluntary nature. Finally, the fourth part 
suggests the idea that a possible remedy aimed at stopping labor rights 
violations is to create and implement a universal rule for labor protection 
through international customary law. Such a remedy would also perform a 
change in the way the responsibility for compliance to labor law is placed 
upon states, by shifting the obligation to punish misconduct of multinational 
enterprises from developing states to developed ones. 
 
I. PAST AND PRESENT VIOLATIONS OF LABOUR RIGHTS 
 
As of 2015, poor labor conditions and weak labor standards are still the 
norm in most developing countries.1 In some cases, national legislation 
provides for labor protection and minimum standards, however many times 
these rules remain unapplied.2 The problem of poor labor conditions is, in 
fact, deeply linked with the overall structure of the world economy.3 
                                                
1 See JENNY CHAN & CHARLES HO, THE DARK SIDE OF CYBERSPACE. INSIDE THE 
SWEATSHOPS OF CHINA’S COMPUTER HARDWARE PRODUCTION (World Economy, Ecology 
and Development 2008); FLORIAN BUTOLLO ET AL., BUY IT FAIR: GUIDELINE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE PROCUREMENT OF COMPUTERS (Jan-Peter Hermann trans., World Economy, 
Ecology and Development 2009); Sophie Stracke et al., IT Workers Still Pay the Price for 
Cheap Computers, China Lab Watch (Nov. 2013), https://www.danwatch.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/IT-workers-still-pay-the-price.pdf; Charles Duhigg & David 
Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-
for-workers-in-china.html?_r=0. 
2 See, e.g., Ronald B. Davies & Krishna C. Vadlamannati, A Race to the Bottom in 
Labour Standards? An Empirical Investigation, 103 J. DEV ECON. 1 (2013); William W. 
Olney, A Race to the Bottom? Employment Protection and Foreign Direct Investment, 91 J. 
INT’L. ECON. 191 (2013). 
3 See Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Ellen Reese, The Challenges of Globalization for 
Workers: Transnational and Transborder Issues, 31 SOC. JUST. J. 1, 1 (2004). 
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According to Harvard researchers Michael J. Hiscox and Nicholas F. B. 
Smyth, many are the critics of the current globalized model of economy, 
which allows corporations to exploit cheap labor in developing countries, 
with the result of generating “race to the bottom” phenomena in labor 
standards.4 In fact, due to being forced to compete between each other, 
governments of developing countries struggle to keep on lowering labor 
rights of their workers, so to encourage foreign investments of big 
multinational employers.5 
As scholar Lena Ayoub explains, in some cases, developed countries 
which host multinational enterprises feature national legislations entitling 
workers of basic labor standards.6 However, even with this, the economic 
pressure multinational enterprises are able to put upon host countries is 
more effective than the law in the books. The result is that many developing 
countries are willing to condone the misbehavior of employers operating in 
their territories, as long as multinational enterprises do not leave the 
country.7 As corporations bring about investments and jobs, with the 
consequence of an overall improvement of the country’s economic 
conditions, host countries often directly engage in “advertising campaigns” 
promoting their low requirements on foreign investments. In turn, 
multinational enterprises do not hide that, due to high costs related to 
compliance with higher labor standards, much of the choice on the location 
of their business depends on local economic conditions in relation with 
labor costs. As a consequence, developing countries are stuck in a situation 
in which they are in need for money coming from investors, while they are 
unable to increase their labor standards, as they are under the risk of losing 
a significant part of their national income coming from foreign 
investments.8  
For what concerns the actual working conditions of workers from host 
countries, critics have long been concerned about the use of “sweatshops” 
for the production of a wide range of exporting items, from electronics9 to 
                                                
4 Michael J. Hiscox & Nicholas F.B. Smyth, Is There Consumer Demand for Improved 
Labor Standards? Evidence from Field Experiments in Social Product Labeling 




6 Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It – and Why the United States Shouldn’t: The United 
States’ International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights 
Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395, 422-23 (1999). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Tragedies of Globalization: The Truth Behind Electronics Sweatshops. No 
Contracts, Excessive Overtime and Discrimination: A Report on Abuses in Ten 
Multinational Electronics Factories, China Labor Watch (Jul. 12, 2012,) 
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clothing.10 
In this regard, Ayoub argues that the practice of subcontracting the 
manufacturing of their products to sweatshops has been very much common 
among large multinational corporations, and it still is.11 
Following the author’s description, some of the main features of 
sweatshops include the following: “ten to twelve hour work days with 
forced overtime; work that is performed in unsafe and inhumane conditions 
(including exposure to poisonous chemicals); punishment for the slightest 
mistake; locked dormitory work conditions; pay averaging less than a living 
wage; excessively demanding long hours of work without compensation of 
overtime pay; systematic abuse and/or sexual harassment of workers by the 
employer(s); and/or the inability of workers to organize.”12 In many 
instances, workers perform their duties inside enormous buildings where the 
employer gathers hundreds of the workers altogether. Not infrequently 
armed guards patrol the premises of sweatshops, in order to stop people 
both from entering and leaving the building during work hours.13 
Early developments of these manufacturing strategies took place in the 
1970s, when multinational enterprises first began massively entering 
developing countries’ labor markets, in order to cut off production costs and 
increase profits.14 The fact that big multinational enterprises approached 
developing economies was gladly welcomed by receiving countries. Thanks 
to the positive conjuncture of the presence of easily corruptible politicians, 
weak governments, already poor living conditions and huge masses of 
people willing to work in return for very poor wages, developing countries 
started to engage in a battle to serve foreign enterprises with environments 
featuring constantly decreasing labor rights.15 
 
II. PRESENT 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upfile/2011_7_11/20110712.pdf; T. Clarke & M. 
Boersma, The Governance of Global Value Chains: Unresolved Human Rights, 
Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply Chain, J. BUS. ETHICS, DOI 
10.1007/s10551-015-2781-3 (July 2015); C. Myers, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
Consumer Electronics Industry: A Case Study of Apple Inc, Georgetown Univ. (2013), 
http://lwp.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Connor-Myers.pdf. 
10 See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and The Alien Tort Claims 
Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533 (1998); John Miller, Teaching about Sweatshops and the Global 
Economy, 61 RADICAL TCHR. 8 (2001); Allie Robbins, The Future of the Student Anti-
Sweatshop Movement: Providing Access to U.S. Courts for Garment Workers Worldwide, 3 
LAB. & EMP. L.F. 120 (2013). 
11 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 397. 
12 Id. at 400. 
13 Id. at 400-01. 
14 Id. at 401. 
15 Id. 
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After more than forty years, the situation has unfortunately remained the 
same. The particular example of working and living condition of Chinese 
workers is striking. As writer Ross Perlin reports, Foxconn, the second 
biggest company in the world for number of employees,16 counts some 1.4 
million workers in only its Chinese plants.17 In those plants, underpaid and 
exploited workers work up to one hundred hours a week and in extremely 
unsafe environments in order to reach staggering levels of production of 
electronic devices.18 Here, the workers execute the orders made by many of 
the biggest electronics corporations on the planet, including Apple, Nokia, 
and Sony.19 The conditions of Foxconn workers only begun to attract 
coverage by media when in 2010, fourteen workers jumped off the windows 
of the dormitories they lived in, in the desperate attempt of giving a voice to 
their previously unheard outcries.20 As a consequence, the company 
installed “suicide nets” across Foxconn buildings, created twenty four-hour 
“care centres,” invented “no suicide agreements,” and engaged in recruiting 
suicide-free pre-screened personnel. Despite all of these changes, the 
company still failed in taking any major step to improve workers’ real 
living conditions.21 
Once the presence of multinational enterprises in developing countries 
became more noticeable, governmental organizations on the international 
train began the draft of a series of legal documents aimed at fixing 
guidelines for the behavior of multinational enterprises.22 In this regard, the 
contributions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have 
been particularly significant. 
As authors David Kinley and Junko Tadaki recall, these guidelines are 
typically directed at states rather than corporations themselves and, 
although not legally binding as they qualify as soft law instruments,23 they 
foresee mechanisms of implementation, which enable a certain degree of 
control on the behavior of firms with regard to labor standards.24 
                                                
16 Ross Perlin, Chinese Workers Foxconned, DISSENT, Spring 2013, at 46, 47-48. 
17 Id. at 46. 
18 Id. at 47. 
19 Id. at 47-48. 
20 Id. at 46. 
21 Id. 
22 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 402. 
23 Broadly defined by George Washington University Professor Dinah Shelton as, 
“normative provisions contained in non-binding texts.” DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM 292 (Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000). 
24 David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human 
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However, despite the existence of such mechanisms, the effectiveness of 
these guidelines in terms of monitoring and punishing firms’ misconduct 
has been rather low.25 
As the authors report, “the monitoring bodies do not function as judicial 
or quasi-judicial bodies, but rather their roles are limited to clarification of 
the interpretation of the instruments.” Furthermore, “they do not make 
specific findings of misconduct by individual companies and their identities 
are kept confidential, thereby shielding them from public scrutiny and 
potential embarrassment.”26 
In addition, on the side of hard law,27 in recent years, ILO has produced 
many conventions signed and ratified by a number of states all over the 
world. According to Ayoub, these conventions are addressed to states and 
usually leave states the choice of implementing the best mechanism to 
comply with the normative requirements they need. Traditionally, single 
conventions cover a specific topic of concern, directly related to the issue of 
improving poor countries’ labor standards and banning labor practices, 
which clearly breach universally recognized human rights.28 Indeed, the 
connection between labor law and human rights law are several. There are 
more than seventy-five ILO conventions directly related to the provisions of 
the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Among the former, single conventions address the problem of forced 
labor,29 minimum age of workers,30 minimum wage requirements31 and 
                                                                                                                       
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 931, 
949 (2004); see also INT’L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976). 
25 “From the point of view of regulation of human rights abuses by TNCs, the 
implementation mechanisms of the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration can hardly 
be considered intrusive on states or corporations . . . Furthermore, while the Guidelines and 
the Declaration encourage TNCs to respect internationally recognized human rights norms, 
they simultaneously uphold the primacy of national law. Thus, they can do nothing to 
prevent host States from adopting lax labor and environmental standards, and TNCs cannot 
be condemned for taking advantage of such standards.” Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 25, at 
950-51. 
26 Id. at 950. 
27 According to Arizona State University Professor Kenneth W. Abbott and Chicago 
University Professor Duncan Snidal, in the field of International Governance, the term hard 
law “refers to legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through 
adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for 
interpreting and implementing the law.” K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000). 
28 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 417–20. 
29 Int’l Labour Org., Forced Labour Convention (Geneva: ILO, 28 June 1930); Int’l 
Labour Org., Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (Geneva: ILO, 26 June 1957). 
30 General Convention of the International Labor Organization, Minimum Age 
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maximum working hours.32 
However, in most cases, the whole set of conventions elaborated by ILO 
falls into a trap render many other international law provisions ineffective, 
namely the fact that conventions “are binding only upon ratifying states and 
lack effective enforcement mechanisms in which to monitor state party 
compliance.”33 It follows that, “if member states do not comply with the 
standards derived from conventions, such states are not faced with any 
sanctions or punishments.”34 The evident shortcomings of such legislation 
may only be overcome by the use of persuasion and by implementing a 
“name and shame” policy upon states through the mass media. 
In fact, media pressure has already proven to be a powerful tool to 
persuade big firms to behave responsibly.35 
It was precisely what happened between the 80s and 90s to corporations 
which centered their business around their name recognition: once the 
media started to publicly expose the massive violations of human and 
workers’ rights they had been responsible for many years, many of them felt 
obliged to take steps towards changing their firm policies.36 As author Ryan 
P. Toftoy recalls, in that period, big multinational enterprises became aware 
of the fact that consumers were actually interested in the issue of 
establishing safe and fair working standards for the workers who 
manufactured the goods they could find in stores and shops in the 
developed world.37 In the U.S. such an interest had remained silent for 
                                                                                                                       
Convention, U.N. Dᴏᴄ., A/CONF.(June 26, 1973). 
31 Int’l Labour Org., Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, June 22, 1970, 
http://ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMEN
T_ID:312276. 
32 Int’l Labour Org., Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, Nov. 28, 1919, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=normlexpub:12100:0::no:12100:p12100_instrumen
t_id:312146:no; Int’l Labour Org., Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, Nov. 17. 1921, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_IN
STRUMENT_ID:312159:NO. 
33 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 419. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 402 (“Once the news media published accounts of the systematic labor 
violations occurring abroad, there was no economically sound way MNCs could go about 
business as usual and still profit from their name recognition. While documented 
corporations felt pressure to respond to the public outcry, corporations not documented for 
any violations thrived off of the big name corporations being branded as human rights 
violators . . . Furthermore, many corporations, in order to attract consumer approval and 
procurement, engaged in product labeling whereby they affixed a label to their products 
certifying that the products were made under acceptable working conditions.”). 
36 Id. at 402-03; see also Helen Keller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and their 
Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy, 194 LEGITIMACY IN INT’L L. 219 (2008). 
37 Ryan P. Toftoy, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater. 
Is Nike Just Doing It?,15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 905, 918 (1998). 
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decades until it finally emerged in 1995. In that year, a survey 
commissioned by Marymount University in Arlington (Virginia)38 was 
published revealing that seventy-eight percent of the interviewed U.S. 
consumers would avoid retailers if aware that they were dealing with 
sweatshop goods, while only eighteen percent of consumers would shop 
there anyway.39 For many big American corporations this fact marked a 
milestone in the history of fair labor. The risk of losing profits due to 
consumers’ awareness of violations of labor rights became a stimulant for 
engaging in internal reforms aimed at improving employment practices. As 
a result, many firms in the U.S. drafted and adopted self-imposed Code of 
Conducts, establishing basic labor standards.40 These standards were 
applicable to all the branches of their worldwide supply chain and banned 
the most hideous practices such as the use of forced prison labor, as well as 
child labor.41 
In this regard, the most famous example has been perhaps the Code of 
Conduct adopted by Nike, the world largest sneaker company,42 that 
became famous throughout the 1970s and 1980s for massive violations of 
human rights committed against its own workers or workers of its 
subcontractors around the world.43 Some of the provisions of the 1992 Nike 
Code of Conduct included the prohibition of the use of forced and under-
aged labor.44 The code also made efforts to establish standards regarding 
minimum wage and maximum work hours, besides promoting compliance 
with local labor law provisions.45 Some critics still think that Nike, as well 
as other companies, which openly publicized campaigns in favor of 
improving labor standards, only did it in order to regain the trust of their 
consumers without engaging in any of the operations of improvement they 
                                                
38 The Consumer and Sweatshops, MARYMOUNT UNIV. (last visited Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://connect.marymount.edu/news/garmentstudy/overview.html. This survey, 
commissioned by Marymount University, Center for Ethical Concerns and conducted by 
International Communications Research, was repeated three times in 1995, 1996 and 1999. 
39 Toftoy, supra note 38, at 919. 
40 Id. 
41 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 404. 
42 Toftoy, supra note 38, at 919. 
43 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 407. According to Ayoub, NIKE’s operations have been 
located in South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand. 
Currently, thousands of female workers employed at NIKE factories: are underpaid, 
earning below a living wage; work twelve to fourteen hours per day, seven days a week; 
suffer corporal punishment, abuse and sexual harassment; are children; and, have been 
forced to work overtime in violation of laws regulating overtime wages. After being on the 
defensive for quite some time, NIKE finally has publicly admitted that the conditions in its 
factories need to be improved. 
44 Id. at 410. 
45 Id. 
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had set forth.46 Despite this, the inauguration of the Code of Conducts is 
remarkable. Such a phenomenon brought forth a wholly new approach to 
the issue of fixing labor standards by moving from a traditional positivist 
standpoint where international organizations and states are the only actors 
in the international community responsible for drafting and enacting labor 
law, to a view that acknowledges and holds private firms responsible as 
well. 
Yet, as Tufts University Professor Jette Steen Knudsen argues, “this 
approach is still quite new as it has developed only in recent years, when 
normative expectations about the role of the firm in society have shifted 
from a traditional shareholder focus to include a diverse range of 
stakeholder interests.”47 Consequently, now investors, NGOs, employees, 
general customers, and the media have all become more used to the idea of 
holding firms directly accountable for maintaining high social and ethical 
standards.48 
The same new approach lies right in the middle of another soft law 
instrument, which has been promoted and has later seen the light under the 
auspices of the United Nations, after being personally sponsored by former-
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. According to expert in business ethics 
and Professor at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana), Oliver F. 
Williams, the new initiative, named UN Global Compact, “intended to 
increase and to diffuse the benefits of global economic development 
through voluntary corporate policies and actions.”49 The project consisted 
of the draft of a legal document directly addressing private firms, which 
includes nine to ten basic principles for firms to follow in order to 
collectively take action to stop labor and human rights abuses. The UN 
Global Compact is also concerned with environment and corruption and – 
according to New York University School of Law Professor Philip Alston – 
has been largely depicted on another soft law document, the 1998 ILO 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,50 to which the 
scholarly community has often devoted much interest.51 
In this regard, Alston argued that, although the Declaration was a soft 
                                                
46 Id. at 411. 
47 See generally Jette S. Knudsen, Company Delistings from the UN Global Compact: 
Limited Business Demand or Domestic Governance Failure?, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 331 
(2011). 
48 Id. at 331. 
49 Oliver F. Williams, The UN Global Compact: The Challenge and the Promise, 14 
BUS ETHICS Q. 755 (2004). 
50 See generally Hillary Kellerson, The ILO Declaration of 1998 on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights: A Challenge for the Future, 137 INT’L LAB. REV. 223 (1998). 
51 P. Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International 
Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 457, 518 (2004). 
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law document, it constituted a revolution within the labor rights 
legislation.52 The Declaration has had power because it has been claimed to 
be applicable to every ILO Member State, regardless of the fact that 
Member States have actually ratified the relevant conventions on the same 
subject.53 The Declaration focuses on a set of rights, which have been 
considered to be at the highest level of importance, surprisingly imposing a 
hierarchy of principles in labor law. This set of “Core Labour Standards” 
consists of freedom of association, freedom from forced labor, freedom 
from child labor, and the principle of non-discrimination in employment.54 
As previously announced the UN Global Compact incorporates these 
principles while shifting the focus from states to firms, asking the latter to 
actively join the project on a voluntary basis. 
According to Williams, each firm participating in the UN Global 
Compact is invited to develop a firm policy internalizing the principles 
within the core of its business activity, as well as to perform periodic checks 
on the evolution of such a process.55 In order to enhance transparency and 
give incentive for firms to behave in a responsible way, a description of the 
report has to be submitted to the project website. The initiative also entails a 
penalty for firms that fail to comply with such a requirement, as firms not 
submitting any report are delisted from the group of participants.56 
The idea that lies behind the project, which in turn represents a real 
novelty in comparison with the Code of Conducts, is to create a network of 
ethically behaving firms rather than leaving this responsibility to single 
firms alone. Moreover, such networks should be strongly integrated within 
the neighboring environment, in order to elaborate the most appropriate 




Although the initiative entails a new and potentially striking approach, it 
nonetheless falls into the same accountability trap as other such projects. 
Hence, critics of the Compact have strongly stressed the fact that, even 
though it features a self-monitoring activity, nobody can actually know if 
the policy a firm claims to have undertaken has been actually followed.58 In 
                                                
52 Id. at 459. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 458-59. 
55 Williams, supra note 50, at 756. See also MALCOLM MCINTOSH ET AL., LIVING 
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: STRATEGIC ROUTES TO SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS 
(2003). 
56 Williams, supra note 50, at 756. 
57 Id. at 757. 
58 Id. 
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this respect, as Williams recalls, many scholars denounce the lack of an 
independent monitoring system, claiming there is a need for a body of 
monitors capable of transforming general principles into real practices by 
means of “measuring” and “quantifying” corporate adherence to the 
programme.59 Other critics hold a more radical position against the idea that 
improvement in labor standards may be achieved through a mere voluntary 
instrument, as they claim it takes a universally binding legal framework to 
bring about labor protection and hold violators accountable.60 In addition, 
according to Knudsen, evidence is given that despite the initial enthusiasm 
that followed the UN Global Compact, in the last years many firms that had 
previously committed to the humanitarian cause, have recently failed to 
implement the action they planned, with the consequence of being removed 
from the initiative.61 
All in all, the UN Global Compact and all the other initiatives, both 
private and public, have been proven to be far from perfect for the purpose 
of solving the problem of labor standards inequality between developed and 
developing countries. It is therefore essential to go beyond the currently 
existing institutional networks and legal theories to find out which could be 
the most optimal legal remedy to effectively tackle this problem for the 
future. 
 
IV. REMEDY FOR FUTURE 
 
As we have seen above, it is not unusual that violations of labor rights 
take place in developing countries in spite of national legislation, which 
although formally binding, results in being unapplied in a way or another, 
even by claiming that visiting multinational enterprises enjoy special 
exemptions under which domestic law does not apply. Moreover, as 
Columbia Law School scholar Robert J. Liubicic recalls, host countries 
normally engage in a competition to host foreign investors by offering the 
least costly labor law arrangements and minimizing enforcement of labor 
standards.62 According to Ayoub, the consequence is that, although in 
theory the principal actors responsible for implementing fair labor standards 
should be the governments of host countries (i.e. where the actual violations 
take place), realistically the economic weakness of such states prevent them 
from enforcing both international and domestic labor law provisions against 
                                                
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 758. 
61 Perlin, supra note 17, at 331. 
62 Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: 
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights through Private 
Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111, 149 (1998). 
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visiting multinational enterprises.63 Given this premise, if we believe that 
the issue of labor exploitation, due to globalization, has now become a 
matter of concern for all countries in the world, it is clear that other ways to 
oblige multinational enterprises to stop unlawful employment practices 
must be found. 
As a solution, the path we may follow to achieve such a goal could be 
the one of prosecuting multinational enterprises for the violations 
committed abroad in their home country. This idea has been taken further 
by Ayoub, who places an obligation upon the U.S. to intervene in order to 
stop worldwide violations of labor rights by convicting multinational 
enterprises based within its territory.64 Hence, in her article, this scholar 
argues that such an obligation derives from both the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which has been signed and ratified by the 
U.S.65 and from international customary law.66 Furthermore, the U.S. itself 
has a strong domestic legislation on labor rights67 which, however, it refuses 
to enforce towards employees of foreign countries.68 
With special regards to the Covenant, the author explains that Article 5 
places both a right and an obligation upon states to check whether private 
actors behave in a responsible way so to avoid violations of human rights 
protected by the convention.69 Therefore, it would be the responsibility of 
the U.S. to ensure private actors such as U.S.-based multinational 
enterprises not to violate the rights listed in the Covenant, although they are 
of civil and political nature. In this regard, the author explains “economic, 
social and cultural measures run hand-in-hand with civil and political 
protections because economic and social constraints placed upon society 
lead to the eventual abuse of political and civil violations.”70 Thus, the 
obligation upon the signatory states are not confined within the narrow 
border of civil and political matters, but cover other basic rights whose 
respect is of primary importance in order to fulfill civil and political aims. 
An even more revolutionary approach to the issue of granting a 
                                                
63 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 422.   
64 Id. at 423-25. 
65 Id. at 425-27. 
66 Id. at 427-30. 
67 Id. at 433 (explaining that this circumstance is also relevant for the purpose of 
recognizing an obligation to punish misconducts of U.S.-based multinationals under 
international customary law, as although most of the countries in the world fulfill the 
requirements of state practice and opinio juris we will later focus on, “the traditional 
definition of custom rests solely upon the individual nations’ behavior,” thus “to hold the 
United States accountable to enforce international labor norms upon its national 
corporations, the U.S. must itself evidence state practice and opinion juris.”). 
68 Id. at 424. 
69 Id. at 426. 
70 Id. at 427. 
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worldwide recognition of the obligation to protect workers’ rights is to 
place it under international customary law. Hence, this source of 
international law is more effective than conventional law, since it is binding 
on all states the world over, regardless of the single state’s willingness to 
actively make efforts to grant labor protection to its citizens. This source is 
also relevant for the purpose of holding private violators accountable for 
labor law violations committed outside the states’ borders. 
As proposed by Ayoub, placing an obligation on all states to protect 
worldwide workers would allow and compel developed states to fill the gap 
of developing states in ensuring and enacting labor law, by applying in 
national courts universal rules on labor standards.71 In this respect, the real 
question is to prove that basic labor standards, such as the prohibition of 
forced and child labor, the obligation to provide adequate wages and to 
establish a limit for work hours, are already norms in international 
customary law. 
Traditionally the scholarly community recognizes two main elements 
for a norm of international customary law to be seen as such. Firstly, the 
circumstance that the state to which the norm applies must have already 
engaged in the practice provided by the norm (state practice). Secondly, 
following such a practice must have been for the state the consequence of 
considering the fact of conforming to the practice as a binding legal 
obligation (opinio juris).72 
In this respect, Pepperdine University (California) Professor of Law 
Roozbeh Baker explains that since the 1970s, several scholars have started 
questioning the legitimacy of the traditional definition of custom only based 
on the adherence to such requirements, by calling for a change in the 
interpretation of what actually defines international customary law.73 Such 
scholars74 have often argued that the signing of a treaty or a convention, 
                                                
71 Id. at 411-21. 
72 “It is possible to detect two basic elements in the make-up of a custom. These are the 
material facts, that is, the actual behavior of states, and the psychological or subjective 
belief that such behavior is ‘law’ . . . . It is understandable why the first requirement is 
mentioned, since customary law is founded upon the performance of state activities and the 
convergence of practices, in other words, what states actually do. It is the psychological 
factor (opinio juris) that needs some explanation . . . . This is the psychological factor, the 
belief by a state that behaved in a certain way that it was under a legal obligation to act that 
way. It is known in legal terminology as opinio juris sive necessitatis.” MALCOLM N. 
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-75 (2008). 
73 Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old 
Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173, 174 (2010). 
74 See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent 
Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347 (1981); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: 
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982); 
Louis B. Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986); 
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with special regards to the ones concerning human rights provisions, even 
when it creates new legal norms, may be seen in itself as evidence of the 
creation of new international customary law.75 By drafting from the 
International Court of Justice finding in North Sea Continental Shelf, in 
which the Court affirms that “widespread and representative participation in 
a convention”76 as well as the passage of a “short period of time”77 may 
suffice to establish an international customary norm binding on all states, 
this strain of the non-traditional scholarship goes further. Hence, according 
to Baker, these scholars argue that, instead of being a slow-paced 
imperceptible movement, the formation of international customary law 
should be regarded as a fast-moving process therefore capable of producing 
sudden changes in the world legal sphere.78 As a consequence, for the non-
traditional scholarship, the role of opinio juris in the formation of 
customary law becomes predominant against state practice, being the latter 
only a factor of secondary importance to prove the effectiveness of a 
general acceptance of the rule, rather than the manifestation of single 
political wills from states.79 
The view we have presented so far has largely been drafted from the 
position held by an earlier wave of legal scholars that have consistently 
questioned the centrality of states in the process of creating international 
customary law. According to these thinkers, states should no longer be 
considered as being the only actors on the international train.80 For instance, 
Professor of Law at U.C.L.A. School of Law Isabelle R. Gunning begins 
her critique of the traditional international legal framework by challenging 
the definition of “absolute state sovereignty” from a feminist and 
Afrocentric perspective.81 As a result she finds that nowadays the notion of 
state sovereignty should be reviewed as to include a “cooperative” as well 
as a “coercive” foundation.82 In addition, as the world has been called for 
the recognition of many existing international entities other than states, such 
as international organizations which have progressively institutionalized 
within the texture of international relations (the United Nations among the 
                                                                                                                       
Ann D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1110 (1982). 
75 Baker, supra note 74, at 174. 
76 North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger./Den., W. Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20). 
77 Id. 
78 Baker, supra note 74, at 182. 
79 Id. at 181-82. 
80 Id. at 182. 
81 Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of 
Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 217-18 (1991). 
82 Id. at 213. 
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others) and non-governmental organizations, a reasonable effect of such 
developments should be to allow non-sovereign entities into the process of 
creating customary international law.83 
According to her theory, the real challenge of modern times is to see 
beyond the traditional understanding of international law that considers 
inconsistent practice by states as a barrier for the formation of new 
international customary law rules. In this respect the author wonders what 
consequence stems from consistent behaviors of groups of nations working 
collectively through an international organization body (such as the UN 
General Assembly), while their behavior as “individual nations” has been 
proven inconsistent.84 According to Gunning, the consequence is that 
although disagreements between collective bodies or their members are not 
uncommon, this bare fact does not exclude an effective regulatory power 
upon the collective itself.85 Therefore, consistent state practices within 
international organizations should count as relevant for the formation of 
customary law. At the same time, the international community should 
recognize the possibility for NGOs to take part in the law making process, 
by recognizing the importance of their activism for promoting changes in 
certain legal areas (for instance, women’s rights) and by virtue of their 
accomplishments in monitoring the enforcement of international rules.86 
Given these premises, the changes, which have affected the world in the 
last several decades, urge the international community to take action in 
order to modernize the current system of international customary law, 
especially in the light of the fact that it still represents the most powerful 
legal source at the international level. However, even regardless of this need 
for a change in the traditional approach, it is not difficult to claim that some 
basic rules concerning workers’ rights have already gained the status of 
customary norms. 
In this respect, Ayoub argues that a number of provisions deriving from 
international treaties and conventions regarding the protection of workers’ 
rights;87 even if not directly binding for signatory states, are so widely 
                                                
83 Id. at 220. 
84 Id. at 223. 
85 Id. at 225. 
86 Id. at 227-34. 
87 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(hereinafter CRC); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (hereinafter CEDAW) International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter 
ICESCR); Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively, July 18, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 1341 (hereinafter ILO 
Convention No. 98),; Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 881 (hereinafter ILO Convention No. 87). 
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accepted and followed that they fulfill the first requirement, namely state 
practice, for international customary law provisions to become recognized 
as such.88 Going through the analysis of the actual numbers of states signing 
the relevant international documents,89 the author reaches the conclusion 
that there is strong evidence to sustain that, for what concerns labor rights 
regarding forced labor, minimum age, minimum wage and hours of work, 
most states recognize and consistently assure through practice such rights.90 
As for the second, requirement, namely opinio juris, the author submits that 
all the states in which the enforcement of provisions in favor of the 
protection of workers being born at international level amounts to the level 
of state practice, such enforcement is the result of the state recognition of a 
binding legal obligation to respect international labor rights.91 Hence, given 
the fact the U.S. itself meets both the requirements of state practice and 
opinio juris regarding international labor norms, the author claims that the 
state is therefore under the obligation of punishing violations of workers’ 
rights committed by U.S.-based multinational enterprises.92 
Although the example brought by Ayoub especially refers to the case of 
the U.S. and the corporations based within its territory, the legal reasoning 
that lies behind may indeed find application to all nations in the world, with 
special regard for those developed countries which do not find themselves 
in a impaired position due to lack of economic strength. In this respect, once 
established a universal rule against the exploitation of workers, the issue of 
its violations would primarily fall within the jurisdiction of the national 
courtrooms of the state in which the corporation is based.93 However it is 
not excluded that the jurisdiction for such complaints may also extend to the 
International Court of Justice or any national judicial body entitled to decide 
upon the violations of norms of international customary law committed 
abroad, such as the U.S. district courts which are given jurisdiction for 
breaches of “the law of the nations” under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 
1789.94 
                                                
88 Ayoub, supra note 7, at 430-31. 
89 Id. at 430 (“As of this writing (1999) 142 state parties have ratified ICESCR, 135 
have ratified CEDAW, 191 have ratified the CRC, 150 have ratified the ILO Forced Labor 
Convention, 135 have ratified the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 71 have ratified 
the Minimum Age Convention, 41 have ratified the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 
and 116 have ratified the Hours of Work Convention, No. 14.”). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 432-33. 
92 Id. at 433-38. 
93 Id. at 439. 
94 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015) (“The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). Applying this statute in 
cases of serious violations of human rights, U.S. courts have invoked the principle of 
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In addition, this circumstance would also prevent multinational 
enterprises from avoiding lawsuits concerning violations of workers’ rights 
by relocating their headquarters in developing states, where they may hope 
for a milder judicial response to the violations they commit. 
A possible negative result of a collective worldwide solution process is 
that the final prices of manufactured goods may significantly rise if 
multinational enterprises are not willing to cut back on their profits. As 
Ayoub explains, this circumstance reveals an inherent contradiction 
between the consumers’ will to find inexpensive products and their 
intention to prevent human rights violations overseas.95 However, recent 
experiments conducted by Harvard and Stanford researchers demonstrate 
that there is an increasing consumer demand for goods made in workplaces 
featuring fair labor standards.96 In some cases evidence shows that 
consumers are even willing to pay a 45% premium for ethically labeled 
goods, hence undermining the bad consequences of an increase in prices as 
long as such an increase is the effect of rising worldwide labor standards.97 
Finally, as Ayoub recalls, obliging multinational enterprises to apply 
enhanced labor standards would create the positive impact of a wage 
increase for all workers the world over, with the consequent benefit of 
boosting consumer demand. This would achieve higher levels of 
competition among countries and reaching higher efficiency trends in the 
allocation of both labor and final goods.98 
All in all, the final destination of this whole process of change in the 
field of labor protection is the formation of a worldwide network of 
international cooperation aimed at eradicating the practices of labor 
exploitation, regardless of where they are committed. If both developed and 
developing countries submit to a universal rule on labor protection, the 
competition mechanism that nowadays stimulates race-to-the-bottom 
outcomes in national legislations will finally come to an end. 
 
* * * 
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